Community Policing in Comparative context: P.R.C. vs. U.S.A.

By

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“Our public security work … is not to have matters monopolized by the professional state agencies. It is to be handled by the mass… The mass line principle … is to transform public security work to be the work of the whole people…”

Minister of Public Security
Luo Ruixing (1994:57)

“It is only a slight exaggeration to say that if American crime prevention is a device by which citizens assist the police, in China it is seen as a method by which police provide back-up services for citizens…”

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Introduction

In the U.S. community policing originated as a “quiet revolution” seeking recognition in the 70s (Kelling, 1988; Greene, 1989) and has since become a tour de force to be reckoned with in the 90s. (Bayley and Sheering, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1994; Corder, 1989). While community policing has been described as a “quite revolution” by some (Kelling, 1988), it was adopted with a roar and not a whimper by many. Robert Trojanowica and Bonnie Bucqueroux observed that community policing has now attained a “critical mass.” (Robert Trojanowica and Bonnie Bucqueroux, 1990: 71) Such a “critical mass” is evidenced as much by scholarly publications over community policing (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Golstein, 1990; McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd, 1993; Skolnick and Bayley, 19, 1986; Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, 1990; Toch and Grant, 1991) as through practitioners’ active and robust participating in public exchanges and private discourses over program implementation and policy implications of the idea. (Brown, 1985; Couper & Lobitz, 1991; Stamper, 1992; Walman & Olson, 1990; Williams & Sloan, 1990).

For all intent and purpose, community policing in the 1990s has replaced professional policing of the 1960s as a controlling paradigm. (Rosenbaum, 1994). In academic discourse, problem oriented policing jargons has effectively replaced those of law (Dixon, 1997), due process, crime control (Packer, 1969), and social discipline (Choongh, 1997). In training forums, police officers are taught to identify, analyze, solve and evaluate problems (SARA or Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) than remembering laws, reciting regulations, and regurgitating polices. They are taught how to listen and question than how to give orders and demand answers. They are taught many ways to deal with customers’ problems, e.g. from mediate disputes to negotiating peace, than one best way to enforce the law and impose order, e.g. tactical shooting. They are taught how to balanced competing communal interests instead of imposing a dominant legal order. (Toch and Grant, 1991: Chapter 4) In operational practice, reactive policing has been replaced by proactive policing. Incident driven policing has been replaced by problem oriented policing. (Goldstein, 1990; Toch and Grant, 1991). Mobile patrol has been replaced by foot patrol (Police Foundation, 1981; Trojanowicz, 1982). Shift policing has been replaced by team policing (Sherman, 1973). Relief policing has been replaced by sector policing (Scott, 1998: 269-288). Military ranks has been replaced by collegial relationships. Dictatory command has been replaced by participatory management. (Angell, 1971).

As a “movement,” community policing is a guarded success. Almost everyone who is involved with “modern” policing is expected to be knowledgeable about, proficient with, and committed to the idea and ideal of community policing (Moore, 1992). “Community policing has become the new orthodoxy for cops…is the only form of policing available for anyone who seeks to improve police operations, management, or relations with the public.” (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994: 3-4). Community policing is an ideological cult in the making; generating more slogans than substance and creating more followers than leaders.
Part of the reason why community policing is successful as a police reform movement is due to the fact that it can made to stand for all things to all people. “One reason for its popularity is that community policing is a plastic concept, meaning different things to different people. There are many perspectives on community policing, and each of them is built on assumptions that are only partially supported by empirical evidence.” (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994:3). Community policing reform, unlike the professional policing reform before it, captures the imagination of its followings not because of a clearly defined vision (e.g. police professionalism) and well articulated mission (e.g. police education), but because it can be made to fit policing reform agenda of very political persuasions, ideological orientations, leadership style, organizational culture and community setting, without compromising community policing as a theoretical concept or strategic program.

Ironically enough community policing as a reform movement, much like traditionally policing itself as a policing strategy it replace, is “reactive” in nature and “incident” driven in application. It has been used as a fire fighting measure to address a variety of macro social concerns, political demands, and local dissatisfaction, e.g. from responding to fast emerging consumerism (Squires, 1998: 169-188) to addressing deeply entrenched dissatisfaction with the police in a pluralistic society (Reiner 1995:121-128). Major social events (e.g. cumulated research findings), political happenstance (e.g. diminish in police legitimacy) and economic circumstances (e.g. growth of funded policy research), not theory and concepts nor research data and findings, define the concept, sustain the development, and influence the direction of community policing (Reiner, 1997:997-1049). Community policing is driven from without and not sustained from within. It is a practice in search of a theory. Thus observed while far from being a spent force, the future development of community policing, notwithstanding self-induced optimism of many, are at best uncertain and at worse doomed. All it takes is another awakening.

However, the battle for the hearts and minds of the police practitioners have not been completely, nor as it now appears, easily, won. This is evident by the reincarnation of conventional policing in the form of zero tolerance policing (Denis, 1996; Bratton, 1998) in the name of public disorder and community fear of crime (Kelling, G.L. and J. Q. Wilson, March 1982; Wilson, J.Q. and Kelling, G.L. February 1989; Kelling, G.L. and C. M. Coles, 1996), the rediscovering para-military policing (militarization of police, e.g. SWAT team, and policization of military forces, e.g. war on drugs) in the face of growing concern with drug and violence (Kraska and Paulsen, 1997; Waddington, 1999: 125-140), and the return of performance culture in the midst of limited and competing police resources and expanding public needs.

It goes without saying that community policing has a lot of critics, detractors, naysayers and resisters (Moore, 1994:285-6). Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley have long observed that community policing is not a ready made panacea for all time, people, place, issues and problems. (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Other thoughtful scholars and reflective practitioners have complained that community policing is a “rhetoric” (Kocklars, 1988) used to capture public support, co-opt academic participation, neutralize political oppositions and overcome police organizational resistance, rather than designed to withstand critical theoretical analysis and empirical support. These scholars and practitioners were quick to point out that “the emperor has no clothes on,” i.e. the innovative idea is old news; a “Return to the Future” policing style. From the earliest of time police have always been a part of the community, e.g. kin police, private policing, and “Peel police principles” (Rawlings, P., 1995; Reith, 1952). They also conclude that community policing fails of its essential purpose when most needed, i.e. in divesting police authority, reinventing community, and empowering citizens (Friedman, 1994: 263-273; Weisburd, 1994: 274-277). A few more philosophical thinkers are troubled by the implications of some of the underlying assumptions to community policing, e.g. should police help to define and shape community norm or otherwise should and can the police act neutrally when call upon
to do so, if they are working closely with the community or segment thereof regularly and on a partnership basis (Riechers and Roberg, 1990). A sizable number of police practitioners, from executives to mid-managers to patrol officers are objecting to community policing because it challenges their self image as crime fighter personally and attenuates their vested interest as an autonomous profession organizationally. Whereas the senior executives are persistent in protecting its established turf from power sharing arrangements with other communal and social agencies, the mid-mangers are insistent on protecting its traditional organizational authority and discretion from being compromised by their subordinates, and the police officers are most protective of their public image as crime fighters and law enforcers from being demystified and secularized. (Toch and Grant, 1991: 66-67). More disturbingly, community policing has just been accepted as a fiat accompli without vigorous theoretical debate, critical conceptual analysis and valid and reliable empirical support (Moore, 1994).

Looking at it from a worldwide perspective, the community policing movement has not been universally well received. Thus, while the Singapore’s Neighborhood Police Posts have been considered a model of community policing (Bayley, 1989) and the Japanese police have huge success with their “koban” as community centers (W. Ames, 1981: 13; Bayley, 1976: Chapter 2), the Australian police managers (Moore, 1994: 201-203) and rank and file (Moore, 1991) have yet to be completely convinced of the effectiveness and efficacy of community policing (“democratic communal policing”) sufficient for them to embrace it without professional reservation and personal resistance (Munro, 1987; Bayley, n.d.; Soloff, n.d.) and the German police has to work hard to allay citizens’ fear of government intrusion into privacy (Gramckow, 1995:20) left over by the Third Reich. In Hong Kong, the police have had great difficulty in engaging the public in tending to their community problems as a result of years of induced dependency and imposed passivity under the Colonial regime. (Chiu, 1996; Cheuk, 1999; Wong, 2000).

Turning to China, social control has always been provided for by the local communities and intimate associates. Historically, much of social life was regulated by grass root and indigenous social institutions (Sprenkel, 1962) e.g., family (Wilbur, 1978: 113-175), clan (Liu-Wang, 1959; Hu, 1948; Yuen-Fong, 1977: 101-127), village (Yang, 1974; Smith, 1899:228; Wilbur, 1978: 118-175), guild (Chan, 1975: 28-40), and voluntary associations (Wong, 1971: 62-73, 64). More recently, the PRC authority mobilized and empowered the mass to take control of its own community (Luo, 1994:57; Bennett, 1977: 121-139). For example, according to a 1991 national survey (30 provinces, 1178 counties), over 80% of the village committees performed their self-governing role and functions, e.g. providing for public security, according to expectation and as provided by the law. (Li and You, 1994: 124). The Chinese experience in community policing, until recently, has been a positive one, as evident by community solidarity (Topley, 1967:9-44; Li & You, 1994: 4-5), communal activism, and a low crime rate. (Feng, 1999: 18).

Table 1: 1979-1993: PRC Criminal Cases Recorded (lian) (10,000)

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<th>Criminal Cases</th>
<th>Serious Criminal Cases</th>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>63.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>131.6</td>
<td>53.93</td>
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Source: Abstracted from (Feng, 1994: 40).

Even taking into account the deteriorating of community and rising rates of crime (Table 1), the Chinese community social control (Wong 1996) – policing experience compares favorably with that of the U.S. in big cities and urban areas (Skogan, 1990), which is characterized by community fragmentation (Rosen, 1990:9-12; Reiss, 1984: 43-58), apathy, (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 29-38; Weisburd and Elroy, 1988), dependency (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 319), clienthood (Peak and
Glensor, 1996:45-7; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988: 189-19), and high fear of crime (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981: 121).

This is an investigation into the philosophy informing People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) community policing. This paper is divided into four parts. Part I states the focus and justifications of this research into PRC community policing philosophy. Part II outlines in brief the U.S. approach to community policing; serving both as a literature review and a comparative context for the study of PRC’s community policing to follow. Part III describes the philosophy of Chinese community policing, past and present. Part IV summarizes as it discusses the lessons provided by this investigation into PRC community policing philosophy.

I. Research focus

There is no basic text on policing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) other than but there are a few dated criminal justice books touching on PRC policing. The classic ones are Cohen (1968), Leng and Chiu (1985) and Brady (1982) and the newest entry being Tanner’s work (1999). Recently, there are some western literatures, most of them descriptive accounts, on aspects of policing in the PRC. (Ward and Dorothy, 1985: 36-8; Johnson 1985; Ward, 1985; Patterson, 1988: Fu, 1990; Dutton, 1992; Dutton, 1992a: 200-207; Dutton and Lee, 1993:316-336; Dutton, 1995: 305-315; Tanner, 1995: 277-303; Ji, 1995: 553-562; Wong, 1994; Wong, 1996; Wong, 1996a; Wong, 1997; Wong, 1997a; Wong, 1998:87-113). They are to be read within a larger context of criminal justice reform and development in modern China: on dispute resolution (Clarke, 1991: 245-296); on community crime prevention (Zhang etc. al. 1996(1):199-222); on correctional practices (Johnson, 1990:15-32); on mediation (Fu, 1990: 81-88); on crime control strategies (Ma 1995: 247-256); on comprehensive treatment of crime (Situ and Liu, 1996: 95-116); on reintegration shame (Liu, 1999:115-126); on delinquency control (Wong, 1999: 27-41); on drugs control (Wong, 1999: 97-114). However, none of them are concerned with the philosophy of contemporary PRC community policing. The closest one gets are a few fairly old introductory accounts on social control philosophy and practice in the PRC. (Lubman, 1967: 1284-1359; Clark and Rojek, 1977; Wilson, Greenbalt and Wilson, 1997).

Students of PRC community policing have to look elsewhere for information and inspiration to guide their study. One often-neglected literature sources are historical treatises on communal rural social control at the family, clan (Liu-Wang, 1959), village (Madsen, 1984), and community level (Hsiao, 1960:261-370). To the extent that Chinese rural communities are closed and stable socio-political-economic systems, they survive the test of time (Wen, 1971). Chinese culture, as with all other cultures, is an endearing, enduring, and above all powerful institution (Yin, 1960: Chapter 1). It strikes us most insidiously and when we are most vulnerable; at the heart (sentiment) and in the head (idea). Thus, examining the past allows the PRC bound researchers to gain insights into the present. Traditional philosophy and culture of social control endures long after their progenitor and utilities are gone. The other valuable sources are the few richly choreographed ethnographic studies of PRC villages. They provide rare empirical data on the day to day operations of communal social control in China (Hinton, 1966; Huang, 1989; Parish and Whyte, 1978; Hayes, J., 1982a:294-297; Hayes, J., 1982b: 297-302). Finally, the PRC criminologists and police scholars have provided some authoritative documentary accounts on law and policy bearing upon the communal social control system (Yanli, 1994: 229-234; Li and You 1994: 111-118).

This cursory review of literature shows that there is currently no English study of the philosophy of community policing in the PRC (Schmalleger, 1997: 614-622, esp. note 15; Peak, 1997: 361-366; Robbins, 1980: 50-69). More often than not, comparative criminal justice scholars fail to include China’s emerging criminal justice system within their purview (Bayley, 1979; Cole et. al, 1981; Bracey
and Fenwick, 1986; Fairchild, 1993). For example, in his seminal work on international policing, Bayley did not include Chinese police in his study; though he did make some passing comments to show his awareness. This failure to include Chinese criminal justice system in mainstream criminal justice text and otherwise marginalization of Chinese police studies though regrettable is traceable to the convergence of a number of factors, such as historical (Mannheim, 1965; Holyst, 1979), language, culture, ideology, professional, and most importantly, lack of literature in English. (Ross, 1966: 263-273). This paper is a first attempt to fill and enrich this observed literature gap.

As observed, the contrast between the U.S. and Chinese community policing in terms of philosophy, practice and impact is great and deserves further in-depth investigation and critical examination (Pepinsky, 1973: 51-60; 1975: 330-42; Braithaite, 1989). This area provides a fertile ground for cross-cultural research. This line of research offers us an opportunity to broaden our intellectual horizon and deepen our practical understanding of community policing. Cross-cultural studies allow us to compare our ways of doing things with others and in doing help us to gain some insights into our own thinking, e.g. is the way we conceptualization of community policing the one and only way? What are some of the alternative formulations? More particularly, when we apply western “community policing” theoretical concepts and propositions to the study of oriental communal social control, we will be able to draw invaluable lessons about their relative strength and weakness and revealing in turn their validity, generalizability and universality. In all, comparative or cross-cultural research helps us, as police students, policy setters, and law makers to be more open minded and less insular, more critical and less complacent, more creative and less dogmatic, more global and less provincial, more visionary and less short sighted. (Birkbeck, 1993: 307-323). In the words of Bayley, a quintessential comparatist himself: “Comparison is basic to all analytic inquiry. ..With respect to the police, then, analysis indeed requires comparison, as it does for any subject matter…” However, as a methodological note, readers should also take to heart Bayley’s insightful admonition. “Parenthetically, it should be noted that cross-national and cross-cultural; research are not the same: one can also study counties without studying multiple cultures; one can also study multiple cultures without cross international borders.” (Bayley, 1982:20-21).

II. The Practice of Community Policing in the U.S.

The emergence of community policing

Since coming of age in the 1900s (Fogelson, 1977, Chapter 3), the American police have adopted a scientific (Talor, 1911), technocratic (Leonard, 1938; Vollmer, 1936, Manning, 1983:169-170), bureaucratic (Weber, 1947), militaristic (Fogelson, 1977: Chapter 2), and legalistic approach to policing (Bittner, 1983). It all started with August Vollmer who was successful in re-engineering Berkeley Police Department into a model of professionalism in a Progressive Era (Fogelson 1977; August Vollmer, 1933:161-175). Vollmer introduced mobile policing (first on bike and later with automobile) to enhance police presence, two ways radio system to improve upon field communication and supervision, traffic light system at street corners to regulate traffic and improve road safety, lie detect test and modus operandi file system to facilitate more effective criminal investigation, rigid entry requirement, scientific screening process and university education for police officers to promote professionalism (Carte, 1973: 274-246; Douthit, 1975: 101-124; Regional Oral History, 1972) Vollmer’s effort was followed by O.W. Wilson, his able student, who introduced the American police to modern management. (Fogelson, 1977: Chapter 6; Walker, 1977).

In the late 60s and early 70s, radicals from the far left – from Vietnam war protesters to civil rights activists – staged repeated protests to make the police less repressive and more accountable to the public. Various national commissions - President’s Commission on the Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), National...
Advisory Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1968), National Advisory Commission on the Campus Unrest (1970), National Advisory Commission on the Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1970) - discovering a looming legitimacy problem and emerging police vs. public crisis, especially with the marginalized and outcast segments – minority, poor and uneducated - of the community, openly called for drastic police reform to police structure and process (Goldstein, 1990: 9), in particular the improvement of police-community relationship. (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). The police responded with better police-community relations programs, e.g., the foot patrol (Police Foundation, 1975; Trojanowitz, 1982) and team policing programs (Sherman, 1973) to close the widening gap between the police and the policed (Trojanowicz and Bucquerous, 1990). This initial police-community reform movement gave us, amongst others, the San Diego Police Department innovative Community Profile Development project (1973) which requires the police “to improve the delivery of police services by (a) increasing the patrol officer’s awareness and understanding of the community the officer serves; and (b) by improving his or her response to area problems through the development of new patrol strategy.” It also gave us the Cincinnati Community Sector Team Policing (COMSEC) program (Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1994: 147-163).

In the late 80s, police reform was fueled by a belated realization that traditional and professional policing does not work in preventing crime or detecting criminals. For example, a cursory review of comparative criminal data shows that there is no necessary relationship between police manpower and crime. In 1987 U.S. cities over one million have the highest ratios of police to people (320 per 1000,000), but they also have the highest serious crime rates. Cities have more crime also have more crime per police, e.g. Dallas had the highest crime rate (16,282 per 100,000) and Kansas City, Missouri had the lowest (3,789), yet they both have almost the same number of police, i.e. 2.3 vs. 2.4 police officer per 100,000. In 1990, Seattle and Houston has one third fewer officers per capita than Los Angeles (409 vs. 409 vs. 282) but one fourth to one third less violent crime per capital (1,607 and 1,388 vs. 2.384) (Bayley, 1994:4-5). Particularly, repeated studies have shown that there is no relationship between strength of police forces and crime rates. These data and findings across the Atlantic and similar kind in England led the British Audit Commission of Local Authorities and the National health Service (1991) to conclude “The terms of public debate need to move off the assumption that more police officers and more police expenditures lead to commensurate increase in the quantity of quality of police output.”

More particularly, two decades of critical police researches have shown that (Skolnick and Bayley, 1985: 4-5; Petersilia, 1989) (1) increasing police presence does not necessarily reduce crime rates or raise the proportion of crimes solve (Kelling et. al 1974); (2) random motorized policing neither reduces crime nor improves chances of catching criminals (Kelling et. al 1974); (3) saturation patrolling does reduce crime, but only temporarily, largely by displaying it to other areas; (4) the kind of crime that terrifies Americans most – mugging, robbery, burglary, rape, homicide – is rarely encountered by police on patrol (Reiss, 1971); (5) improving response time to emergency calls has no effect on the likelihood of arresting criminals or even satisfying involved citizens (Beck and Kessler, 1977); (6) crimes are rarely solved with offenders arrested and prosecuted through painstaking investigations conducted by the police detectives but readily available information gathered from witness from the scene (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1976).

At about the same time, police researchers discovered the delapidating impact and demoralizing effect of disordered neighborhood, e.g. fear of crime. (Kelling and Wilson, 1982; Kelling and Wilson, 1983; Kelling and Coles, 1996). They also found that that disorder and fear could be measurably reduced by bringing the police back to the street and amongst the people. Thus, the police responded to increase in
crime, disorder and fear with innovative ways of delivering police services to better address community’s needs and concerns and with their involvement - participation, assistance and support. These police measures have come to be known as community-oriented policing; the most famous of which is the problem oriented policing (POP) (Goldstein, 1990). The primary examples being Madison Police Department’s problem analysis methods (Goldstein, Herman and C. E. Susmilch, 1982) Baltimore County Police Department’s COPE units (Cordner, 1986) and New York City’s CPOP officers (McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd, 1993).

Finally, in the 90s, the impetus for police reform came from the most unlikely quarters, the fiscal conservatives who wanted more affordable and effective policing (Uchida, 1991: 14-30). The police reacted by engaging the public in solving the crime problem in their own community as a revenue saving measure (Radelet, 1986: Chapter One).

The conceptualization of community policing
Community policing has been variously defined; some by purpose and functions, others by structure and programs, still others as a philosophy, spirit, and in the case of China, a political ideology. Peak and Glenor openly acknowledged that there is a conspicuous lack of conceptual clarity and agreement in community policing as an idea or program:

“For more than 15 years police agencies have been adopting new strategies for delivering services to their citizenry. These new strategies have been called community policing, community oriented policing, problem oriented policing, neighborhood oriented policing, problem solving policing, and a host of other things. What these names mean is often difficult to determine. A department that asserts that it is undertaking community policing may, under close scrutiny, be implementing a strategy that is based on a problem oriented approach. A department that claims to be engaged in problem solving may be doing more to smooth over police community relations than to address persistent problem.” (Peak and Glenor, 1996: xxiii)

While different interpretation and application of “community policing” strategy might indicate some confusion with the meaning of the term, in of itself it does not conclusively demonstrate that the idea of community policing lacks conceptual integrity and/or theoretical substance. For example, police executives might assess each community’s needs differently or might choose to implement police “community policing” in a way that is most acceptable to the local community. In essence, disparate understanding and different application of “community policing” has many causes in context, one of which might be that the term is not well defined or susceptible to meaningful definition. However, the most likely explanation for observed disparate understanding and variegated application of “community policing” is the fact that police operations and practice unlike policing theory and concepts are not driven by theoretical unity and logical consistency but dictated by political expediency and social utility. For example, police agencies as a public organization is often measured by three inter-related productivity concepts: effectiveness, efficiency and equity (Rosenbaum, 1994). In as much as effectiveness in a police agency is hard to measure (crime rate is notoriously unreliable) and equity concerns, e.g. minority relationship, are prominently reported. There is a tendency for the police to ignore effectiveness in favor of equity issues, e.g. avoid confrontation with minorities to promote better community relations. Likewise, since improvement of efficiency can easily be demonstrated, e.g. better process of cases, and effectiveness cannot be easily made apparent, e.g. solving more cases, there is a tendency to improve upon internal structure and process, which has no bearing on police effectiveness.
What then exactly is community policing? Functionally and in purpose, community policing is community self-ordering and independent regulation of one form or another. For example, Manning suggested that “community policing” can be seen as the ordering or regulating of an interacting group of persons within a governmentally defined territory. Thus it is not a unique function, objective, characteristics, or defining feature of policing. In a sense, all policing is community policing. (Manning, 1986:486-9).

Structurally and programmatically, community policing has variously been equated with problem oriented policing, team policing, and foot patrol policing, etc.

As an ideology and philosophy, community policing is putting the people in control of their own neighborhood. Community policing as a philosophy is how people think about police-community role and relations, not just a strategy, tactic, or program (Flint, 1998: 12; Trojanowicz and Carter 1988: 17). Community policing as a philosophy seeks to engage the community as co-producer of law and order: ranging from consulting the community (Trojanowicz et. al, 1987) to involving the community in solving its own crime and related social problems (Rosenbaum, 1989:203-218). To Bueger this means having the community engaging in: (1) intelligence gathering (“eyes and years”); (2) political support (“cheerleading”); (3) financial support; (4) public support (“symbolically confrontational”); (5) fighting crime and disorder (“actual confrontation”) (Buerger, 1994). For Bayley (1994) this involves consultation, adaptation, mobilization and problem solving.

For example, in Montgomery County, Maryland, the police chief appointed a Montgomery County community police steering committee which included sworn and non-sworn department members and individuals representing other government agencies, the business community, and civil associations. The committee held public forums whereby the citizens could express their views on how best to conduct community policing (Peak and Gleson, 1996:60). In Chicago, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) seeks input from residence by beat meetings which bring together police commanders, officers, and citizens to identify problems and determine appropriate courses of actions. (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997)

In this regard community policing has been defined as:

A belief or intention held by the police that they should consult with and take account of the wishes of the public in determining and evaluating operational policing and that they should collaborate with the police in identifying and solving local problems. (Bennett, 1994:224-248).

This definition comes close to what was originally intended. Sir Robert Peel, the father of modern policing, has observed that:

The police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain public respect … The police … are the public and that the public are the police; the police are the only member of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of the community welfare…(Radelet, 1984: 4)

The basic assumptions of community policing
The basic assumption underscoring the idea of community policing is the conviction that community problems – crime included – cannot be effective and efficiently dealt with without the active
involvement - support, participation, and assistant - of the public in its policy formulation and execution. The police cannot be expected to solve a community’s crime and disorder problems in four senses.

First, the people themselves are in the best position to provide for the first line of defense against crime and disorder. Conversely, if the people do not care about their own personal safety and community welfare to act assertively, there is very little the police can do about community crime and disorder.

The first thing to understand is that public peace … is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the police (Jacobs, 1961:31-2).

Second, the police have limited resources to deal with the multitude and varieties of community problems, including crimes and disorders, requiring its attention. Simply put, the police cannot be omnipresent and omnipotent. As Herman Goldstein observed:

It is simply not possible for a relatively small group of individuals (whether 10 in a community of 5,000 or 28,000 in a city, such as New York, of seven and a half million), however powerful and efficient, to meet those expectations. A community must police itself. The police, at best, can only assist in that task. We are long overdue in recognizing this fact (Goldstein, 1987:17).

Third, the police have limited capacity to deal with crime as a multi-faceted social problem (Reiss, 1986: 15). The police are only one of the many social control organizations. It cannot be expected to deal with community crime problems single-handedly. It has to rely on other community agencies and social institutions:

Community participation, stresses interprofessional or teamwork approaches to solving community problems… Take the crime problem… Clearly, the police are concerned about it. So are the courts and other criminal justice institutions. So are the schools, religious bodies, social-work agencies, various community organizations, labor unions and nosiness management, and the mass media. The crime problem is extremely complicated. No single community force, not even the police, has the total answer. Police officers have a certain experience with the problem. It is not the same experience that, say, school principals have… The art of devising programs, therefore, is that of bringing together all these forces in some sort of cooperative, coordinated venture, to cope with problems too complex for any single force to solve (Radelet, 1986:27).

In this regard, while the police, as a result of its historical mission (providing for the general welfare of the people), political authority (monopolization over the use of force) and functional capacity (expansive jurisdictional access and year-round 24 hours availability) is in the best position to seek cooperation and provide for coordination of concerned parties (schools, religious bodies, community groups, social work organizations, business enterprise, judicial system) to cope with the crime problem, by itself the crime problem in a community is too complex for any one agency, including the police, to solve.

Fourth, the police have little control over the political, social, economic, and cultural environments. For example, social structural conditions - poverty, broken families, ethnic divisions - giving rise to crime
and disorder. The police cannot effectively change or ameliorate them (Riechers and Roy R. Roberg, 1990: 105-114; Rosen, Marie S. 1998: 9). To the point, Patrick Murphy the police commissioner from New York City observed: “American policing … cannot possibly wipe out crime, because the causes of crime are huge, profound, and possibly beyond the capacity of any set of democratic institutions to eliminate.” (Murphy and Plate, 1977)

Whatever the definition, community policing has been practiced in the U.S. in one of the three ways: public relations, community services, and community participation. Police public relations – to “make” the people more understanding of the police, police community services – to cultivate people’s appreciation of the police, and community participation – to invite the people a partner to police work, represents various attempts by the police to get the community to be involved with their own order and security. The rationale being, if the public is more understanding, appreciative, and involved with the police, police work is made much more effective, efficient, responsive, and accountable (Radelet, 1969). The inter-relation between these approaches is best summed up by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration (1967): “A community relations program is not a public relations program “to sell the police image” to the people. It is not a set of expedients whose purpose is to tranquilize for a time an angry neighborhood, by, for example, suddenly promoting a few Negro officers in the wake of a racial disturbance. It is a long-range, full-scale effort to acquaint the police and the community with each other’s problems and to stimulate action aimed at solving those problems.” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967:100)

It is significant to note that none of these community-policing practices contemplate that the community should be autonomous in policing itself. Community policing is always externally defined and imposed from without, with the police playing a critical, if not even a determinative, role (Greene, 1989:352). Citizens are encouraged by the police to be “responsible” not “autonomous.” This is an important distinction. “Responsible citizenship” enlarges the public’s responsibility for personal and community safety without undermining police ownership of the problem. “Autonomous citizenship” is a direct threat to police hegemony over policing. (Johnson, 1992: Chapter 7 & 8).

Reflecting on community policing
Coming to implementation and evaluation. There are a number of lessons we can draw on in the last two decades of effort to implement and evaluate community policing. Two more salient ones come to mind.

First, the successful implementation and adequate evaluation of community policing is hampered by the fact that community policing is not a unitary concept nor a uniform practice. As a result it is difficult to define clearly, implement effectively, and evaluate meaningfully. (Manning, 1988; Mastrofski, 1998; Klockars, 1998). As Bayley observed:

> Despite the benefits claimed for community policing, programmatic implementation of it has been very uneven. Although widely, almost universal, said to be important, it means different things to different people – public relations campaigns, shopfronts and mini-stations, rescaled patrol beats, liaison with ethnic groups, permission to rank-and-file to speak to the press, Neighborhood Watch, foot patrols, patrol-detective teams, and door-to-door visits by police officers. Community policing on the ground often seems less a program than a set of aspirations wrapped in a slogan (Bayley, 1988:225).

Second, the successful implementation and adequate evaluation of community policing is limited by a lack of a dominant theory and central thesis to community policing. Notwithstanding its
intellectual dominance, practical significance, and popular appeal, few have taken the time to theorize about community policing. Community policing has just been accepted as a fait accompli without vigorous theoretical debate, conceptual analysis and empirical support. More disturbingly, “One reason for its popularity is that community policing is a plastic concept, meaning different things to different people. There are many perspectives on community policing, and each of them is built on assumptions that are only partially supported by empirical evidence.” (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994:3).

This has led police researchers and government auditors to forgo specific theory anchored and hypothesis derived testing process, in favor of more general and qualitative assessment, e.g. assessment based on effectiveness, efficiency and equity. (Rosenbaum, 1994: 6-17).

Notwithstanding conceptual vagueness and lack of theoretical support for community policing, it has been “successfully” implemented in a number of test sites’ albeit in different manner and with a variety of styles.

In the end it seems that community policing is brought about as a result of force of circumstances, i.e. frustration over failing conventional policing system, more so than actualizing a better theory of policing. In Rosenbaum’s word: “The forces behind this reform movement are numerous, but the visible failure of traditional policing methods to impact permanently the salient problems of violent crime, drug trafficking, gang activity, and police community relationship has only hastened the push to find a more effective and just paradigm for policing in the 1990s.” In Bayley’s word: “It is time for the police to “put up or shut up.” If the studies are true, then police practice should change.” (Bayley, 1994b:10). Finally, in Karp’s word: “Community justice may be identified by four core elements that distinguish the emerging justice activities [including community policing] from prior policies and practices. These characteristics elements are not disclosed on the basis of abstract theory. Rather they seem to be born of the frustrations of implementation, the practical necessities of attempt to improve community life by reducing disorder and crime and by a desire to increase public trust.” (Clear and Karp, 1998:1).

On a larger intellectual compass, community policing is often perceived to be only driven by internal forces and external pressure in the face of dysfunctional organizational structure and insurmountable crime problems, however in reality it also reflects and reinforces broader intellectual currents and larger mutually reinforcing social trends. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. For example:

(1) “Community policing is part of a larger set of changes in progress in the United States. Many of the management practices that community policing advocates – decentralization decision making, problem teams, attention to customer needs, and others- are used widely in industry. Racial fairness, another theme in community policing, is a resurgent theme throughout society. Community is only one manifestation of a larger social concern with quality of life issues. And renewed faith in community empowerment and self-help pervades discussion of how to address virtually any social problem” (Resenbaum, 1994:4)

(2) Community policing is an integral part of community justice movement which focus on neighborhood action, problem-solving, decentralization of authority and responsibility, citizen participation, and grass-root justice. It gives us victim impact statements, community prosecution, neighborhood defense, community prosecution, community court and community correction (Todd and Karp, 1998: 14-5).
Community policing represents the crowning achievement of three decades of higher education for police officers (Lawrence Sherman & National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers. 1978). A movement which began with the modest aim of producing enlightened police officers and creation of a professional police force ends up achieving something beyond its wildest imagination, i.e. transforming police officers as community service worker and applied social scientists. (Toch & Grant, 1991: Chapter 2).

The basic tenets of community policing – need based service program, problem oriented approach and self help strategy - finds resonance and support in some very unlikely places, e.g. education philosophy. A cursory review of education literature reviews two broad trends. One is to make learning more students oriented. This is called “anchored instruction” and more specifically “learner-centered environments” approach. The approach structured instruction and creates instructional environments with the students’ strength and weakness in mind. This is akin to making police service fitting into community priorities and citizens’ need. The second is to make the student an active learner by placing him/her in a problem solving context. This requires the student to learn while working through a problem set requiring various skills and cross-disciplinary knowledge. This is not unlike having police officers working with local residents in dealing with a problem, and in so doing gaining an insight into their own values and capacities. Of course, the long term implications of this kind of education approach is to create future “problem oriented” police officers and citizenry (The Cognitive and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1990).

III. Philosophy of Community Policing in Modern China (PRC)

The PRC has taken a contrary approach, at least up until very recently, in defining police-community role and functions in fighting crime and keeping order.2 “Our public security work … is not to have matters monopolized by the professional state agencies. It is to be handled by the mass… The mass line principle ... is to transform public security work to be the work of the whole people...” (Italics supplied) (Luo 1994:57). To this contrasting and most interesting community policing philosophy we now turn.

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2 A reviewer has pointed out to me that the philosophy of Chinese community policing presented in this paper might not bear strict scrutiny. This is a serious challenge. I respectfully disagree. I take the comment to imply two things. First, the philosophy as espoused in this paper is dated; the paper is not timely. Second, the philosophy as presented is not reflective of practice; the paper is not realistic. In answer to the first comment, I do not think the “philosophy” of the PRC policing – in terms of the police being part of the people - has changed much from 1949. It did not and it cannot. The whole communist China ideology – a government of the people and by the people - rests of that underlying assumption. I have not been able to find any sources – legal, philosophical, policy – that informs me to the contrary and otherwise contradicts my findings. I agree that the PRC officials in the field might have interpreted and applied the philosophy of community policing differently in light of changed economic and social circumstances afflicting PRC since 1949. However, if this is the nature of the objection, we do not say that the philosophy is misstated or dated, but that it was not applied as intended or have not changed with the fast moving society. In essence, to borrow a much used and worn phrase from the law and society movement, the law in the book is not the same as law in the street; a lack of fit between theory and practice. In as much as this is a paper on PRC community policing philosophy, my sole purpose is to reconstruct, as accurately as possible, from existing primary data source what the PRC political leadership and police authority thinks about the philosophy of community policing. How the philosophy is applied, while deserving of attention, is of little concern to me at this juncture; and of still less consequence to what the PRC leadership espoused as to what the proper state community policing doctrine ought to be. This is not to deny the importance of such an investigation, only that there is a need to prioritize research efforts and divide research labor. By making this observation I have provided an answer, albeit indirectly and in passing, to the second comments of the reviewer. I hope this short rejoinder is sufficient to allay the reviewer’s concern. I thank the reviewer for giving me an opportunity to address this most important methodological issue.
The burden of the ubiquitous past
Historically, social control in China was decentralized and organized around natural communal and intimate groups, e.g., family and clan, with governmental endorsement and support. (Dutton, 1992; Wong 1998a:75-119). Local social control was institutionalization. The emperors ruled the state by and through his officials who in turn governed the people by and through the family head and community leaders (Wen, 1971; Chang, 1955). Such decentralized, grass root, social control practices were informed by Confucian teachings:

Wishing to govern well in their states, they would first regulate their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they would first cultivate their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they would first rectify their minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they would first seek sincerity in their knowledge. Wishing for sincerity in their thoughts, they would first extend their knowledge (de Barry, 1960:115).

When asked, “What is meant by “in order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family” Confucius answered:

It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. There is filial piety: - therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission: - therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness – therewith the multitude should be safe (Legg, 1981:23).

Thus, functional social control in China was supplied informally and extra-judicially. This resulted from deliberate state policy, building upon existing natural communal structure of interdependence (Dutton, 1992:84-5), established cultural habits of informal social control (Williams, 1883:507; Cohen, 1960; Chu, 1962; Buxbaum, 1971: 255-79), and entrenched customary practices of clan rule (Liu-Wang, 1959:56). Hence, while in theory the local magistrate’s offices (yamen) were supposed to be in total control on all matters large and small in rural China, in practice broad police powers were delegated or conceded to the local community and exercised by the family and clan (Liu-Wang, 1959: “Chapter II: General Analyses of the Clan Rules”):

The authority of the Chinese pater familias was much stronger than intra-familial leadership required; and he owed his extraordinary power essentially to the backing of the despotic state. Disobedience to his orders was punished by the government. On the other hand, the local officials could have him beaten and imprisoned, if he was unable to keep the members of his family from violating the law. Acting as a liturgical (semi-official) policeman of his kin group, he can scarcely be considered the autonomous leader of an autonomous unit.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Wittfogelt, 1957:50).

PRC crime control policy and practices are very much influenced by historical Chinese (Confucians) thoughts. Chinese traditionally thoughts on social regulation and crime control were informed by the following premises:

(1) Crime control is a local, indigenous, and above all family affairs (de Barry 1960:115).
(3) To be effective, crime prevention must be a multi-faceted, comprehensive, and integrated enterprise, involving the individual, family, clan, neighbor, community, and the state (de Barry, 1960: 115).

(4) To be effective in controlling people and fighting crime a variety of measures are to be used. Thus it was said by Confucia that the best way to regulate people was to “inspire them with justice, correct them with administration, guide them with rites, keep them straight with honesty, appeal to then with benevolence, reward them with benefits, persuade them to follow” (Lee, 1988:61). More specifically, crime control can be best achieved through moral education as supplemented by fast, severe, and speedy punishment (Liu & Yang, 1984:56-64). Current PRC policing doctrine preaches comprehensive crime control by legal, administrative, coercive, incentive and education means.

(5) Crime control will not be successful without also addressing the root causes of crime, such as the moral degeneration of the individual (de Barry, 1960: 115) and criminogenic conditions of the environment (Feng, 1994:72)

Consistent with the above Confucius ideas and ideals, crime prevention and social control in traditional China was realized through indigenous groups – starting with the family which provides the education and discipline for character building, the neighbors which provide the supervision and sanction against deviance, and the community which set the moral tone and customary norms to guide conducts. Finally, the state acts as the social control agency of a last resort in providing punishment against crimes, and economic maintenance and social welfare to anticipate civil disorder. In this regard, the Chinese has taken a broad notion of control that includes the internalization of norms (by the individual), socialization and disciplinary regime (by the family); setting up custom and accountability system (in the community), removal of criminogenic conditions (by the administration) and defining the moral and social boundary (by the state) (Gibbs, 1982:9-11). The Chinese approach come close to Edward A. Ross’ definition of social control - “the molding of the individual’s feelings and desires to suit the needs of the group” – including supernatural, ceremonies, public opinion, morals, art, education which formed the normative structure of a society. In a very real sense, Chinese social control is of a totalitarian gem (Wittogel 1957) and of a disciplining type (Dutton, 1992).

Table 2: Traditional social control philosophy compared: East (China) vs. West (U.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>West</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Justifications of control** | Reformation (offender)  
Restoration (social relationship) (Bayley, 1976; Wong, 1984)  
Reintegration (communal harmony) (Braithwaite, 1992; Goffman, 1971: Ch. 4) | Retribution (victim/society)  
(von Hirschi, 1976:6)  
Deterrence(individual/society)  
(Honderich, 1984)  
Rehabilitation (individual)  
(Morris, 1974) |
<p>| <strong>Subject of control</strong> | Personal character (Analects, Book XV, Chapter 7) – internal thought | Social conduct (Hart, 1977: 1-17) – external behavior |
| <strong>Basis of control</strong>   | Moral wrong (Zhang, 1983: 11-25)                | Legal wrong (Mills, 1859, 1955:13)         |
| <strong>Method of control</strong>  | Education – to reform (Munroe, 1977: 9-13)     | Punishment – to deter (Honderich, 1984)    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Strategy of control</strong></th>
<th><strong>Root of the problem</strong></th>
<th><strong>Manifestation of the problem</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Site of control</strong></td>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of control</strong></td>
<td>Multiple layers –</td>
<td>Unitary system –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual-family-</td>
<td>Judicial – legal – penal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neighbor-clan-state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple focus -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological – physical – social – economical – legal – political – cultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of control</strong></td>
<td>Informal – social</td>
<td>Formal – legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Pepinski, 1973:51-60; 1975:330-342)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time of control</strong></td>
<td>Preventive-Proactive</td>
<td>Remedial-Reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assumption of the controlled</strong></td>
<td>Affective –social</td>
<td>Rational – autonomous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

Chinese social control system is underscored by three broad principles: reformation of offender; restoration of social relationship, and reintegration of the offender into the community. Confucians believe in the malleability of man. In like manner the Communists subscribed to the idea that the "All history is nothing but continuous transformation of human nature" and "central function of government will be treated as the transformation of the social natures of the citizen." (Munroe, 1977: 9-13).

Practically, reformation started with the admission of guilt and assumption of responsibility. Thus, the PRC police preached: “Leniency to those who confess; severity to those who resist.” When Bao Ruo-Wang, a political prisoner of Mao, met with his captor, he was told: “In front of you are two paths: the one of confessing everything and obeying the government, which will lead you to a new life…” (Bao, Ruo-Wang & Rudolph Chelminski. 1973:73) Confucian ideas affect traditional China, contemporary PRC, as well as modern Japan, Japan, and Korea; all are from one big oriental family sharing identical intellectual roots. In modern Japan, the Japanese believe that apology is the first step towards personal reform, repairing of relationship, and re-integration of offender to communal life. (Bayley, David. 1976: 134, 140). Erving Goffman provided a useful framework for the analysis of this “reformative-restorative-reintegration” justice model. Goffman observed that when expectations and norms were broken in the public place the rule breaker and victim engages in a series of highly ritualistic “remedial exchanges” for the purpose of reestablishing social relationship between the offender and victim. The process involves the offender providing an innocent excuse or sincere apology for the transgression to show personal remorse (reformation) in order to re-establish the broken relationship (Goffman, 1971: Chapter 4; Braithwaite, 1989).

**The influence of an all consuming present**

The philosophy of PRC policing, conceptually and operationally, is determined by Communist political ideology. The PRC leadership from Mao to Deng to Jiang advocated that the people (qunzhong) are the master of their own destiny (dang jia zuozhu). Clearly, what constituted “mass line” and how committed Deng, and especially Jiang, is to the notion of “mass line” is a question begging to be answered. For example, how might Mao’s idea of “mass line” be interpreted and applied to policing in practice in the 1990s and in the future, given Deng’s concern with pragmatism and Jiang’s emphasis on technocratic solutions to social ills should be not lightly dismissed and cannot be easily resolved. However, the central thesis of this paper that the local people, by tradition and as a result of
philosophy, are very much involved in policing themselves cannot be challenged. In this regard Dong Biwu stated emphatically:

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\text{The power of the border government came from the mass (qunzhong) ... The government has to listen to the mass, adopt the mass viewpoints, understand the mass life, protect the mass' interest. And that is not enough. It must see to it that the mass has courage to criticize the government, supervise its work, and replace unsatisfactory workers. .. Only through this can the mass feel that the government is a tool in their own hand and the government really their own government" (Peng, 1954:104)
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In practice, this means having the people governing themselves. In the early days of the PRC, Mao practiced this doctrine by using individual voluntarism (Liu-Wang, 1959: 145) and mass mobilization to move the country ahead – in conducting the people's business.

In historical and cultural context, voluntarism in the service of a larger cause, e.g. saving the country or righting a wrong, has a long and venerable history in China. The popular admonitions - “Guojia xingwang, pifu youze” (“the rise and fall of an empire is the responsibility of the individual”) and “xian tienxia ziyou er you, hou tienxia zi le er le” (“one should worry about the world’s problem before all others, enjoy the world’s pleasure after all others) speaks to this philosophical ideal and fairly sum up the sentiment. Though the admonitions have more application to scholars-gentry, they were nevertheless sought after ideals for the common people. For example, Clan rules promote honorary conduct, including rendering voluntary assistance to the needed. (Yu, Yingshi. 1984: 3, n. 1) In point of fact it is said that Chinese intellectuals shared the following characteristics expected of them: (1) a deep concern with public interest matters; (2) an identification with state, government, and public affair as personal responsibilities; (3) a tendency to view political an social issues in moral and ethical terms; (4) a self-assumed obligation to seek ultimate logical solution to problems.

Finally, voluntarism in aid of others (e.g. charity) and in support of higher cause (e.g. honor) were deemed virtuous conducts and should be pursued for their own sake. (Liu-Wang, 1959:145). Thus when the KMT government decided to declare economic war on the British for indiscriminate shooting of peaceful demonstrators in Shamian Canton (June 23, 1925), the KMT enlisted the volunteer help of the people to enforce the Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike (June 23, 1925 to October 10, 1926). In that historical instance, the KMT took a backseat and supportive role. (Wong, 1996a)

In political context, in the early years of PRC, mass struggle and self-criticism, not legal norms and judicial process, is used in ordering society (Brady, 1982: Chapter 4 "Popular Revolution and the Creation of People's Justice"). This means that the Party should work and live amongst the people in order to understand their problem. They should listen to the people in order to formulating solutions addressing their concerns, such that the people’s own “ideas are preserved … and carried through.” “In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily from the masses to the masses… take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action." (Mao, 1967: 226-227). Translated into work style, the police should be on first name basis with the people and work along side with the people, i.e. as close as a family. Police should do good deeds (ban hoshi) and sacrifice for the people so that they will remember. Police should not be isolate from the people (tuoli qunzhong). "In all practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses." (Editor, Renmin Ribao,1956:1).
It is significant to note that the Chinese democratic principle: “from the mass to the mass” diverges substantially from the American’s “by the people and for the people.” The Chinese will have the people ruling themselves. The American would have the people ruled by a government, acting on behalf of the people.

More recently, under the leadership of Peng Zhen and later Qiao Qi, “power to the people” is realized through more systematic and organized means, i.e., structured political representation and enforced legal protection. The doctrine which calls for the local community people to be involved in crime control is contained in the idea that people – family, friends, neighbors – should help in keeping each other out of trouble (Li, 1978).

When the idea of “mass line” is applied to justice administration, “popular justice,” “informal justice” and “societal justice” was preferred over formal, jural, and legal ones. Informal justice model involved the mass in the settling of dispute, e.g., through conflict mediation. Popular justice engaged the mass in the dispensation of justice, e.g., by public denunciation (Leng and Chiu, 1985:11). For example in the earlier years (1950-51) the mass was involved in dispensing with revolutionary justice during the land reform, three-anti (san-fan), five-anti (wu fan) movements. (Beijing Review, 1979:25) In the later years and in judicial work, court trial proceedings were integrated with mass debates, effectively bringing the courts to the people (Cohen, 1968: 17). Mass trials were held in public not to assure a fair trial but to educate the people, raise their consciousness, and empower them.

In terms of policing, “mass line” formed the basis of “people’s policing” whereby the local people are supposed to be self-policed. It is more appropriate to refer to “mass line” policing in the earlier days of the PRC as “people’s policing.” The whole of “the people” as an exploited and oppressed class was mobilized to impose their political will. In the later years (since 1979), “people’s policing” become “community policing” when the local people are encouraged to take part in managing their own affairs.

In the context of fighting against political crimes (and later all social crimes), the people’s participation was deemed indispensable to win the “people’s war” (Sun, 1997:1-4). Thus in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the police was supposed to understand the people point of view, trust the people’s instinct, mobilize the people’s energy, and rely on the people’s support. (Luo, 1959:8). The police played a supplemental, not central, and facilitating, not instigating, role in helping the people to achieve social control and justice. In all, the people were considered the lifeblood and backbone of the police. This PRC policing philosophy while on the surface comports with Sir Robert Peel’s first principles of law enforcement, it actually exceeds Peel’s contemplation and formulation: “The police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain public respect … The police … are the public and that the public are the police; the police are the only member of the public who are paid to give gull-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of the community welfare…” (Lee, 1901, Chapter 12) Peel conceived of the police standing in for the public to achieve law and order when they are not willing or able to do so. Mao envisions the public imposing law and order themselves, and when need arise seek consultation and help of the police.

The people and public security could be said to be co-producer of revolutionary order and justice:

We are following the mass line, freely mobilize the mass, engage in broad propaganda, so that every household is informed, everybody understand, this can transform the suppression of counter-revolutionary movement into a joint action of the government.
and people, thus can obtain the mass’s supervision and support. Because the mass is mobilized the counter-revolutionary cannot hide (Luo, 1959:93).

Practically and operationally, this means that the police must see things from the people’s perspective, seek their support, and be amenable to their supervision (Luo, 1959:189). Any policing detached and isolated from people would not be effective in finding out local problems and in detecting criminals. Hence, one of the more serious “mistakes” that can be committed by the police is having an erroneous work style; being alienated from the mass through subjective idealism (zhuguanzhuyi), bureaucratism (guanliaozhuyi), commandism (minlingzhuyi) (Luo, 1959:213; Jiang, 1996:9; Zhang and Jianging, 1996:3).

The reasons for engaging the people in fighting a “people’s war” against crime are many:

First, the people have the right (quanli) as a ruling class to participate in their own governance. This is akin to the idea and ideal of localism in the U.S. (Briffault, 1990:1-115; 1990) wherein all the powers of the central government come from the people. While federalism envisions a government from the top down, localism conceives of a government from the bottoms up. The legal status and relationship of local associations to central authority (state) is best captured by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Avery v. Midland County* “Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach those countless matters of local concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level.” 390 US 474, 481 (1961) This is captured by and expounded upon by Johnson’s notion of autonomous citizenry. (Johnson, 1992).

Second, the people has the responsibility (yiwu as a citizen) to fight crime. In the PRC people’s rights and responsibilities are complementary. PRC Constitution (1982) Article 33 provides that “Citizens enjoy rights guaranteed by the Constitution and law but they must also fulfill their constitutional and legal responsibility.” The CCP has interpreted this to mean that the concept of right (quanli) and duty (yiwu) is unitary in nature (tongyixin): “People can enjoy right but also have to fulfill their duty, just enjoying rights and not fulfilling duties is not allowed; nor should the assumption of duty without the enjoyment of right be tolerated.” This is to say that right and duty are supplementary to and complementary of each other (“xiangfu- xiangcheng”). (Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao, 1993:89) This is akin to the notion of “communitarianism” in the U.S. which is defined as “a mindset that says the whole community needs to take responsibility for itself. People need to actively participate, not just give their opinions … but instead give time, energy, and money.” (Gurwit, 1933:33-38). This is captured by and expounded upon in Johnson’s idea of responsible citizenry. (Johnson, 1992).

Third, the people is in the best position to see that “people’s justice” is done, including making decisions on who to police, what to police and how to police. Mao supplied the rationale to “people’s policing” in his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan": “The peasants are clear sighted. Who is bad and who is not quite vicious, who deserves severe punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly -- the peasants keep clear accounts and very seldom has the punishment exceeded the crime” (Mao, 1977:28). This is akin to the idea in the U.S. that the community notion of order and justice prevails over the rule of law (Wilson, 1968:287).

Fourth, the people were deemed to be more motivated, thus more vigilant, as an oppressed class to detect the counter-revolutionaries (Luo, 1957:57). This is akin to the idea that citizens of a state, as with employees of an organization, naturally seek responsibility if they are allowed to “own” a problem. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.
Fifth, the people are in the best position, being more able, efficient, and effective in conducting the people’s business. Criminals and counter-revolutionaries lived in the mass. They cannot long survive within the mass without being exposed. For example, a Zheng zhou (a place in China) “zhian baowei” (security defense committee member) noticed that his opposite neighbors have seven people in the house without old people or children. They were supposed to make a living by weaving socks but seldom work. They have no income but live very well. This aroused his suspicion in reporting the case to the authority. Further investigation showed they belong to “guangdao” (rebellious) gang (Luo, 1959: 288-297, 292). This is akin to the notion in the U.S. that the public is the best source of intelligence for the police (Sparrow, 1993:4). In order to be effective, the police must rely on the police as “eyes and years” of the polcie.

Sixth, it unrealistic to expect the police to provide full service and adequate security to the community and society, without self-help from the people. The police could not be everywhere the same time and in any one place all the time. This is especially the case in the sparsely populated area: e.g. border and rural areas (Luo, 1959:317-322,319) It is unlikely that the police could be informed of illegal activities unless informed by the people (Luo, 1959: 347-352).

Table 3: Justifications for community policing: PRC vs. U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P.R.C.</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>“Mass line” - “from the mass to the mass”</td>
<td>“Democracy” – “by the people and for the people”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of justice</strong></td>
<td>People’s justice - Proletarian dictatorship</td>
<td>Legal justice – Communal order and morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public duty</strong></td>
<td>People responsible – communism</td>
<td>Citizenship – communitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utility</strong></td>
<td>People know best</td>
<td>Public as eyes and ears</td>
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</table>

Put into practice, “people’s policing” requires the police to work closely and intimately with the mass. The principle of working with the mass in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries was first espoused by Mao himself in 1943 in Yanan. The “nine principle” (jiu liao fangjin) included item 4: “leadership work closely with the mass” and number item 9: “educate the mass.” (Luo, 1959: 315). In real terms, this means (Luo, 1959: 303-316, 309-311).

(1) The police and the people are not separable. This is identical to the characterization of the nature of the relationship between the police and the people in U.S. community policing literature: “Who are the police? Police are the public and the public are the police…” (Sparrow, 1988: 8-9). This conception of police underscores the Constitutional law doctrine that it is Constitutional to impose citizenship requirement on being a police officer. Citizens have a right to govern and be governed by fellow citizens in matters concerning life, liberty, and pursue of happiness (Johnson, 1992). The doctrine has since been eroded by a boarder conception of “community” membership and participation.

(2) The police have to work with the best interest of the people in mind in protecting their welfare and in promoting their sense of justice. This corresponds closely to the drive to prioritize police work by according to community needs in U.S. community policing: “What are the highest priorities?
Whatever problems disturb the community most” (Sparrow, 1988: 8-9). In the PRC, having the police to act in “the best interest of the people” hinted at Party sponsored “police paternalism” where the Party is supposed to know best, more pejoratively big brotherhood of the “1984” gem. This however is typical of imperial Chinese governing mentality. (Wakeman, 1995:90)

Historically, the state officials were supposed to be the people’s teachers (daoshi) and nuturer (baomu). In the U.S., having the police act upon “what problems disturb the community” has a more democratic ring. However, the police have been quick to reassert its dominance in defining what the community wants. The U.S. Police Code of Ethics of 1957 provides: “As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality, and justice.” Furthermore, and before the recent advent of the community policing movement, what are considered the most pressing community problems are often assumed by the police to be self evident, not ascertained through public consultation and confirmation by way of public survey. This resulted in part from a lack of consensus over community wants and needs as reflecting stratification and diversity in a pluralistic society such as the U.S. It is also caused by a conflict over moral values and competition for social goods prevalent in disintegrated urban centers and segregated residential neighborhoods. In most instances, however, and more likely than not, the public is insensitive and indifference to choice being made unless confronted by the police and forced to be engaged. Wilson has described this as a “zone of indifference” (Wilson, 1968). In such circumstances, the police is prompted or forced into taking a leadership role in enforcing law and imposing order.

(3) The police have to involve the people in informing upon criminal activities and detecting the criminals. This corresponds to seeking cooperation from the people in police work in the U.S.: “What determines the effectiveness of the police? Public cooperation.”(Sparrow, 1988:8-9).

(4) The police have to educate the people as to the meaning and purpose of the state’s crime control policy. In the U.S. this is achieved by opening communication with the public: “What is the role of the press liaison department? To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.” (Sparrow, 1988:8-9).

(5) The police have to engage the people in the execution of state law and policy. In the U.S. this corresponds to seeking cooperation from the people in police work: “What determines the effectiveness of the police? Public cooperation.” (Sparrow, 1988:8-9).

(6) The police have to welcome the people in the supervision of government’s actions. This corresponds to being accountable to the people in the U.S.: “What is the essential nature of police accountability? Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.” (Sparrow, 1988:8-9).

(7) The police have to avoid being isolated from the mass. This corresponds to being close to the community in the U.S.: “What is police professionalism? Keeping close to the community”(Sparrow, 1988:8-9).

However, notwithstanding communists’ high regard for the people, the people are sometimes considered as “wrongheaded”, “ignorant”, “apathetic”, and “not organized”. The Chinese peasants, as a result of traditional culture (being subservient) and forced life circumstances (being dependent on the all powerful government and subjected to the vicissitude of nature) displayed a decidedly passive mentality to the point of being stoic. They were not organized and did not seek to be in control of their destiny. (Hsiao, 1960:264). The police as political leaders must mobilize the people, raise their
political consciousness, and try to organize them. This means that the police should tirelessly educate the people and set an example for them. The police should actively seek out people’s leaders such that they can help to organize the people in defeating the unjust elements. The police should not be critical of the people thereby dampening their revolutionary spirit or destroying their class-consciousness. The police should try to build up a trusting relationship with the people such that they will not be alienated (tuali requn), otherwise the people will not support them (Luo, 1959:72). What is the “proper” role of the police in organizing the community, e.g., should the police react to the public or should the police be an instigator. In U.S. policing literature, the larger issue is whether the police work should be politicized, e.g., by having the police defining and shaping the public’s view on law, order, and crime issues (Bayley, 1988: 225-237). In PRC, the issue is a settled one. The police, as an ideologically more astute and professionally more capable body, is charged with the duty to heighten the people’s political consciousness and in the process channeling it to desire political end, i.e. struggle against the enemy of the state.

Not only were the people involved in purging the counter-revolutionaries and criminals, they were relied upon to decide and execute punishment. Thus counter-revolutionaries would be executed if and only if their execution could bring about the repayment of blood debt (xuezhai) and pacification of the people’s anger (feisha buneng ping mingfen), i.e. contributing to retribution to the mass (Abramson, 1994:22-33). The police must carry out their work as the people wanted them to do so, e.g., counter-revolutionary offenders should be released for “mass” supervision if most people agreed (Luo, 1959: 99-110, 105-106). Ultimately, the people are expected to determine actual case disposition and penal policy after group discussions (Luo, 1959: 116). The community is also entrusted with the supervision (guanzhi) of lesser counter-revolutionaries. (Luo, 1959: 116, 120).Finally, the community (mass) should assist and not ostracize the counter-revolutionary families – they should be given economic sustenance and political education by the people. (Luo, 1959:122).

IV. Conclusion
This article examines the philosophy of Chinese community policing in the backdrop of U.S. experience. It finds that the Chinese philosophy on community policing differs substantially from that of the U.S.

In traditional China, social control is applied indigenously and informally. More specifically, imperial officials are rarely involved as social control agents. In contemporary China, and more particularly under Mao, powers of control belong to the “mass.” More pertinently, people are trusted to resolve their own “contradictions” (conflicts and crime). In this historical and political context, community policing in China means the people police themselves, i.e. personally and communally, with the police playing a subsidiary and supportive role.

In the U.S., social control is imposed externally and formally. Social control is organized, bureaucratized, and legalized and applied by and through the police. The police engage and involve the public only when required, e.g. as driven by political pressure, or as expedient, e.g. in order to conserve resources. Community policing as developed in the U.S. means that the police are the dominant social control agents, albeit with the indispensable help and mandatory supervision of the people.

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this note) to explain the cultural background and social circumstances to provide a context for the statement to be properly understood. It is precisely because of this kind of perception of the deplorable ignorance of the peasantry that prompted the CCP to exercise paternalistic guardianship over their charges.
The two philosophical traditions to social control separating PRC and U.S. have a major influence on how community police is conducted and realized in the two countries; particular in defining what the respective role and functions of the police and citizens are in prevention crime and maintaining order in the community. Ultimately, it is the Chinese philosophy on community policing which comes close to the ideal of policing articulated by the “father” of modern policing - Sir Robert Peel who observed that: “The police … are the public and that the public are the police; the police are the only member of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of the community welfare…” (Radelet, 1986:4).

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